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DETERMINATTVE AUTORITIES 
Defendant submits that the following authorities are determinative: Jones v. Jones, 
700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985); Bingham v. Bingham, 872 P.2d 1065 (Utah App. 1994). 
THIS BRIEF IS SUBMITTED in reply to the Brief of Appellee filed with this Court 
on or about January 12, 1995. PlaintiftfAppellee will be referred to as "Plaintiff. 
Defendant/Appellee will be referred to as "Defendant". 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: REPLY TO POINT I OF APPELLEE'S BRIEF 
In Point I of her brief Plaintiff attempts to justify the alimony award in excess of her 
needs on grounds that at such times as she becomes employed she will incur child care 
expenses. This argument is without merit because at trial Plaintiff included the full amount 
of her work-related child care in totalling her living expenses of $1,640 per month (Trial 
Exhibit "A"; Transcript, R. 400; Footnote 1, infra). 
Plaintiff further argues this Court should consider her Affidavit filed seven (7) 
months after the trial, wherein Plaintiff claims an extraordinary increase in her Mving 
expenses. The Affidavit is diametrically opposed to Plaintiffs testimony at trial and is the 
subject of a Motion to Strike which was filed with this Court on or about September 6, 
1994. Defendant incorporates by reference, as if fully set forth herein, his Motion to Strike 
Affidavit of Plaintiff/Appellee, which was filed in this Court on or about September 6,1994. 
POINT II: REPLY TO POINT II OF APPELLEE'S BRIEF 
It is respectfully submitted that the lower court's quotation of the applicable standard 
for alimony awards is irrelevant when the lower court's ruling is patently inconsistent with 
the standard. 
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POINT III: REPLY TO POINT III OF APPELLEE'S BRIEF 
Plaintiff cites several Findings of Fact entered by the trial court for the apparent 
purpose of inferring that such Findings justify an award of alimony in excess of Plaintiff's 
needs. 
Finding No- 7, noting Plaintiffs temporary unemployment at the time of trial 
provides no justification for imposing an alimony obligation to be paid at a later point when 
Plaintiff is employed. 
Finding No. 8, noting Plaintiff was not continuously employed during the marriage 
provides no justification for imposing an alimony obligation to be paid during post-marital 
periods when Plaintiff is employed. 
Finding No. 9, noting Plaintiff will incur work-related child care expenses when she 
becomes employed provides no justification for the excessive alimony award inasmuch as 
work-related child care expenses were included in Plaintiffs hving expenses at the time of 
trial.1 
Finding No. 10, which also refers to work related child care expenses, provides no 
justification for the excessive alimony by reason of the facts and circumstances noted in the 
preceding paragraph. 
Finding No. 16, noting the number of persons in Plaintiffs household, provides no 
justification for an excessive award inasmuch as the hving expenses stated by Plaintiff 
included the expenses for all members of her household (Transcript R. 400). 
1
 Tr ia l Exhibit "A" which includes Appellee's Statement of Living 
Expenses was prepared prior to t r i a l when Appellee was employed by Golfcard 
International. On page 3 of the Declaration, Appellee noted expense of $300 for 
child care which was intended to refer to work-related child care (Transcript 
p. 33, R. 400). (Trial Exhibit "A"; Transcript pp. 32-34, R. 399-401). 
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POINT IV: REPLY TO POINT IV OF APPELLEE'S BRIEF 
It is respectfully submitted that the lower court's finding concerning Plaintiffs 
education is irrelevant if the ruling ignores such findings and awards alimony in excess of 
Plaintiffs needs. 
With respect to Finding No- 14, wherein the Court states it may take time for 
Plaintiff to obtain full time employment, such finding is not supported by any evidence in 
the record. On the contrary, the record established that Plaintiff was able to obtain 
employment whenever she sought employment (R. 396, 402-404). Even if it be assumed, 
in the absence of evidence, that there would be delay in Plaintiffs obtaining gainful 
employment, such finding does not justify an alimony obligation to be paid to Plaintiff at 
such time as the employment is obtained. 
POINT V: REPLY TO POINT V OF APPELLEE'S BRIEF 
It is respectfully submitted that the lower court's unsupported finding that Defendant 
had the ability to pay alimony does not justify an alimony award in excess of Plaintiffs 
needs. The conclusory "Finding" is not supported by any evidence, and, if fact, is contrary 
to the evidence inasmuch as the alimony award leaves Defendant with a disposable income 
significantly less than his living expenses (See Appellant's Brief, p. 6). 
POINT VI: REPLY TO POINT VI OF APPELLEE'S BRIEF 
There is no case in any jurisdiction that has ever held that a litigant is barred from 
an appeal by reason of "unclean hands" arising from failure to comply with the order or 
judgment from which the appeal is taken. Moreover, such a concept would be contrary to 
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Rules 3 and 4, Utah Rules of Appellant Procedure, which expressly state that a litigant as 
a right to appeal from a final judgment or order. 
The case of Blanton v. Blanton, 18 So.2d 902 (Fl. 1944), provides no support for 
Plaintiffs argument The dictum upon which Plaintiff relies in the Blanton case expressly 
related to a modification petition in the trial court rather than an appeal in the appellate 
court. Furthermore, the case of Hubble v. Cache County Drainage District, 259 P.2d 893 
(Utah 1953), is not a divorce case, and has no bearing whatsoever on the legal proposition 
asserted by Plaintiff in Point VI of her brief. 
POINT VII: REPLY TO POINT VII OF APPELLEE'S BRIEF 
The issue raised in Point VII of Plaintiffs Brief was previously raised in "Appellee's 
Objection to Appellant's Reference to Documents Not Considered by the Trial Court." 
Defendant responded to the Objection in a document entitled "Response to Appellee's 
Objection to Appellant's Reference to Documents Not Considered by the Trial Court" 
which was filed with this Court on or about September 7,1994. Defendant incorporates by 
reference such response. The matter was further addressed in Appellant's Brief, pp. 5-6, 
Footnotes 5-9. As noted therein, the after-tax analysis of which Plaintiff complains was 
submitted to the trial court 
CONCLUSION 
The award of alimony which the lower court required be paid even if Plaintiff is 
employed at her earning capacity is contrary to the guidelines established by this Court. 
Said Order is grossly unfair inasmuch as it provides Plaintiff with income in excess of her 
needs and leaves Defendant with a disposable income significant less than his needs. 
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Accordingly, the Order of the trial court awarding Plaintiff alimony in the sum of $425 per 
month regardless of Plaintiffs employment should be reversed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this _^_ day of February, 1995. 
>ONALD & WEST 
Rqbert M. McDonald 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the \_ day of February, 1995,1 caused to be mailed, U.S. 
mail, postage prepaid, a true and accurate copy of the foregoing APPELLANTS REPLY 
BRIEF to the following named persons: 
Thomas R. Blonquist 
40 South 600 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
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